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Ingando Solidarity Camps:
Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination
in Post-Genocide Rwanda
Chi Mgbako*
The most important teaching I learned at ingando is that the Rwan-
dan people are Rwanda's most important resource. Everything in-
gando gave us, we really wanted. Knowing that everyone is our
brother-we really wanted this.'
Ingando... is about RPF political ideology and indoctrination.2
I. INTRODUCTION
"It was as if all the demons from throughout the world came to Rwanda,"
declared a Rwandan genocide survivor, ten years after the slaughter.' Yet,
despite its unimaginable fury, the Rwandan genocide was not a spontaneous
eruption of "demonic" internal forces, but a calculated plan of extermination
carried out by political extremists. In April 1994, the Rwandan govern-
ment, then dominated by Hutu Power extremists who feared sharing power
with a rebel group-the Tutsi-dominated, Uganda-based Rwandan Patriotic
Front ("RPF")-organized a genocide of the Tutsi minority population and
massacres of Hutu who opposed the genocide and refused to participate in
the systematic killing of Tutsi.4 Militia, government soldiers, the Presiden-
tial Guard, and ordinary citizens killed up to 800,000 Rwandan men, women,
and children in one hundred days of rape and slaughter that spread to all corners
of the country. The international community, which could have stopped the
* j.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School, Class of 2005; B.A., Columbia University, 2001. Many thanks
to my flying Rwandan friends, best left unnamed, for their invaluable assistance during my field research
in Rwanda. A heartfelt thanks to the many Rwandans who graciously agreed to formal interviews and
informal conversations about their fascinating country. My research in Rwanda was made possible by the
generous financial support of the Harvard Human Rights Program and the Reginald F. Lewis Fund. My
deep gratitude to Lars Waldorf for his invaluable, insightful, and thorough critique of an earlier draft of
this Note. Thanks to the editors of the Harvard Human Rights Journal for helpful comments along the
way. Finally, endless gratitude to Iyom and Iddi, for shepherding my love for Africa.
1. Interview with Ex-Soldier/Former Ingando Participant, in Kigali, Rwanda (Jan. 11, 2004).
2. Interview with Journalist/Former Ingando Participant, in Kigali, Rwanda (Jan. 7, 2004).
3. Interview with Genocide Survivor, in Kigali, Rwanda (Jan. 16, 2004).
4. ALISON DES FORGES, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY: GENOCIDE IN
RWANDA 3-4 (1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
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genocide with little effort, watched indifferently5 as the end of the world
arrived in the "the land of a thousand hills." In July 1994, the RPF defeated
the genocidal regime and took revenge killings against Hutu civilians.6
In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, the infrastructure and social
fabric of Rwanda lay in complete ruin. Although the government, remarka-
bly, has restored the physical infrastructure of the country, post-genocide
Rwanda coninues to grapple with a desperate need for reconciliation. Rec-
onciliation mechanisms designed to respond to.atrocities such as genocide,
however bold, are inevitably inadequate.7 Nevertheless, despite these limita-
tions, societies need to establish such mechanisms to come to terms with the
legacies of mass atrocity.8 The RPF-dominated government has employed
ingando, or solidarity camps, both to plant the seeds of reconciliation, and to
disseminate pro-RPF ideology through political indoctrination. The gov-
ernment encourages or requires Rwandan citizens from diverse walks of life-
students, politicians, church leaders, prostitutes, ex-soldiers, ex-combatants,
genocidaires, gacaca judges, and others-to attend ingando for periods ranging
from days to several months, to study government programs, Rwandan his-
tory, and unity and reconciliation.
This Note, based primarily on interviews with ingando participants, gov-
ernment officials, journalists, and genocide survivors conducted in Rwanda
in January 2004, evaluates the merits and limits of ingando as a means of
fostering reconciliation in the complicated social landscape of post-genocide
Rwanda. Focusing on ingando for ex-combatants, ex-soldiers, students, and
released genocidaires, this Note argues that much of the ingando project is
focused on the dissemination of pro-RPF ideology, a dangerous undertaking
in a country in which political indoctrination and government-controlled
information were essential in sparking and sustaining the genocide. Fur-
thermore, a successful reconciliation program must take place in a society
that values human rights; therefore, we cannot evaluate ingando in isolation
from human rights developments in Rwanda. This Note argues that ingando
will fail as a reconciliation mechanism so long as the Rwandan government
continues to attack public spheres of independent thought and criticism.
Part II of this Note provides a brief history of the genocide and an over-
view of current political and human rights developments in Rwanda, argu-
ing that the past ten years of RPF rule has been marked by attacks on politi-
cal opposition, the independent press, and civil society. I then posit that the
government may be attempting to legitimize the ingando project by "invent-
5. Id. at 16-17.
6. Filip Reyntjens, Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship, 103 AFR. AFF. 171, 178
(2004).
7. MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE
AND MASS VIOLENCE 5 (1998).
8. Sadako Ogata, Foreword: Imagining Coexistence in Conflict Communities, in IMAGINE COEXISTENCE:
RESTORING HUMANITY AFTER VIOLENT ETHNIC CONFLICT Xi, xii (Antonia Chayes & Martha Minow
eds., 2003).
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ing tradition"-situating ingando's origins within Rwandan culture and
thereby concealing its roots in the RPF's pre-war practices. Finally, Part II
explores the initial aims and present activities of the ingando project.
Part III presents ingando as a central aspect of demobilization procedures
for ex-soldiers and ex-combatants, as well as a clearinghouse for reintegra-
tion of ex-soldiers and ex-combatants into the current state army. Through
interviews with ex-soldiers and ex-combatants at ingandos, I argue that in-
gando does not adequately prepare ex-combatants and ex-soldiers for the
harsh realities of life post-demobilization. Additionally, I suggest that in-
gando presents a pro-RPF perspective and that the proclaimed governmental
"loyalty" of ex-combatants recently returned from the Democratic Republic
of Congo ("Congo") may be a tradeoff for peaceful repatriation. Finally, I
explore in this Part how government aid for demobilized ex-combatants upon
completion of ingando, in light of minimal government aid for genocide sur-
vivors, has challenged the reconciliation process and fostered resentment. I
argue that compensation for survivors, yet to be realized, may alleviate these
tensions.
Part IV surveys ingando for post-secondary school/pre-university students,
maintaining that ingando is creating a generation of RPF loyalists among
Rwanda's future leaders. The "ethnicity question" within Rwanda dominates
the ingando program for students, and I contend that the government's de-
nial of ethnicity without enlightened and open discussions about history and
historiography ignores an issue that bears critically on the prospects for rec-
onciliation within Rwandan society.
Part V evaluates ingando for released genocidaires. I argue in this Part that
accountability and the recognition of the victimization that has taken place
at many levels of Rwandan society may spark reconciliation processes.
Finally, Part VI assesses ingando's impact in terms of promoting recon-
ciliation, positing that government officials have overstated its success and
ignored the profound lack of reconciliation taking place in Rwanda. I argue
that an ingando-like program that is free of pro-RPF spin and governmental
bias, and that inspires an open and honest dialogue about history and histo-
riography, should be integrated into the school curriculum. This Part con-
cludes that for ingando to be a successful reconciliation mechanism, Rwanda
must become an open society that values political pluralism, freedom of ex-
pression, and human rights.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Brief Historical Overview
In pre-colonial times, as today, three social groups existed in Rwanda-
Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa-united by a common language, Kinyarwanda, com-
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mon animist religion, and common cultural traditions.' Rwanda's popula-
tion currently tops eight million: the majority Hutu comprise eighty-five
percent of the population, the minority Tutsi comprise fourteen percent, and
the indigenous Twa are less than one percent. Although in pre-colonial
times the predominantly cattle-owning Tutsi were politically dominant over
the predominantly agriculturalist Hutu and were sometimes distinguishable by
their physical features, the difference between the two groups was more an
issue of status than rigid and formal notions of ethnicity. Identities were of a
more fluid nature, especially among the Hutu and Tutsi elite.' ° Pre-colonial
Rwandan history was not idyllic, however, and although this time was not
marked by anything resembling "inter-ethnic" clashes between the Hutu
and Tutsi," dissatisfaction with Tutsi feudal lords had taken shape. 2
Following World War I, Belgium became the colonial power in Rwanda
and codified the identities of Hutu and Tutsi into racial hierarchies."3 What
once could be fluid categorizations became fixed ethnic identities, reinforced
by ethnic identity cards, favoritism of the Tutsi elite in colonial administra-
tion and education, and discrimination against Hutu, which strengthened
the Hutu resentment of Tutsi that had developed in pre-colonial times. 4 In
the years before Rwanda gained independence in 1961, the Belgians began
to support a reversal of this hierarchy.1" In 1959, there were a series of mas-
sacres of Tutsi, which drove thousands into exile in neighboring countries
16
such as Burundi, Congo, and Uganda. The period from 1959 to 1994 was
marked by widespread discrimination against and sporadic massacres of the
Tutsi minority in Rwanda. 7 Tutsi refugees, who remained marginalized in
the neighboring countries where they had taken refuge, maintained a fervent
desire to return to their homeland and formed the RPF rebel army in 1988.18
The RPF attacked Rwanda from 1990 to 1993, prompting a 1993 power-
sharing agreement between the RPF and the Rwandan government. 19
After the signing of the Arusha Peace Accords in 1993, hard-line extrem-
ists within the Rwandan government, fearing that they were losing their
grip on political power, undermined the peace agreement and orchestrated
plans for genocide. 20 On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Hutu President Juvenal
9. DES FORGES, supra note 4, at 31-34.
10. JOHAN POTTIER, RE-IMAGINING RWANDA: CONFLICT, SURVIVAL AND DISINFORMATION IN THE
LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 109-29 (2002); see also Wendy Lambourne, Justice and Reconciliation: Post-
conflict Peacebuilding in Cambodia and Rwanda, in RECONCILIATION, JUSTICE AND COEXISTENCE: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 322 (Mohammed Abu-Nimer ed., 2001).
11. Lambourne, supra note 10, at 322.
12. POrrIER, supra note 10, at 112.
13. Lambourne, supra note 10, at 322; see also POTTIER, supra note 10, at 112.
14. Lambourne, supra note 10, at 322.
15. DES FORGES, supra note 4, at 38.
16. Lambourne, supra note 10, at 322.
17. Id. at 322-23.
18. DES FORGES, supra note 4, at 48.
19. Id. at 59-64.
20. Id. at 125-29.
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Habyarimana and the Burundian president was shot down over Rwanda's
capital, providing the excuse the hardliners needed to carry out their plan of
genocide against Tutsi within Rwanda and massacres of Hutu who opposed
the genocide. 2I Despite the terror gripping the country, the United Nations
drastically reduced its peacekeeping force in Rwanda and the international
community refused even to admit that genocide was taking place.2 2 In July
1994, the RPF finally gained control of the country, in the process commit-
ting crimes against humanity and war crimes against thousands of innocent
Hutu.23
The RPF's defeat of the genocidal government prompted the flight of one
to two million Hutu-innocents as well as genocidaires-to refugee camps in
eastern Congo. At the same time, a massive influx of over 500,000 Tutsis
returned to Rwanda. 24 The challenge of building peace in societies that have
suffered from mass violence is increased when returnees return home and
threaten to reignite the violence. 2' This risk was exacerbated in the Rwandan
context, due to the tenuous relationship between genocide survivors and the
Tutsi returnees, whose interests many survivors would eventually argue were
26being more seriously represented by the government. Also, tensions in-
creased after Tutsi returnees, who had remained refugees in Burundi, Congo,
and Uganda for over four decades, demanded the return of lands they had
lost following the 1959 massacres that drove them into exile. From 1994 to
1996, ex-Armed Forces of Rwanda ("FAR," the official military of the Ha-
byarimana regime) and interahamwe (militia death squads), many of whom
had participated in the genocide, formed a nucleus of Armed Groups that
continued to attack Rwanda from eastern Congo." In 1996, the RPF at-
tacked the refugee camps in eastern Congo, killing thousands, in an attempt
to disarm the militias and forcibly repatriate the Hutu refugees. 2s These at-
tacks did not quell the insurgency and in 1997 and 1998, the militias revi-
talized their campaign and began to attack northwestern Rwanda. 29 For four
years, from 1998 to 2002, Rwandan military forces occupied the Congo in a
21. Id. at 181.
22. Id. at 630-35; see also NIGEL ELTRINGHAM, ACCOUNTING FOR HORROR: POST-GENOCIDE DE-
BATES IN RWANDA 1-3 (2004).
23. Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, to John Negroponte, U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations, President of the Security Council (Aug. 9, 2002), available at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/rwanda-ltrO809.htm; see also DES FORGES, supra note 4, at 701-02.
24. Reyntjens, supra note 6, at 178.
25. Antonia Chayes & Martha Minow, Introduction to IMAGINE COEXISTENCE: RESTORING HUMANITY
AF-rER VIOLENT ETHNIC CONFLICT xi (Antonia Chayes & Martha Minow eds., 2003).
26. Reyntjens, supra note 6, at 180.
27. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, RWANDA AT THE END OF THE TRANSITION: A NECESSARY PO-
LITICAL LIBERALIZATION 2 (2002), available at http://www.icg.org//library/documents/reportarchive/
A400817_13112002.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2005).
28. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LASTING WOUNDS: CONSEQUENCES OF GENOCIDE AND WAR FOR
RWANDA'S CHILDREN 7 (2003), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2003/rwandaO4 O3/rwandao4O3.pdf (last
visited Feb. 4, 2005).
29. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, supra note 27, at 2.
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bid to maintain security within Rwanda's borders ° and to plunder the min-
eral-rich area of the Kivus.3" In 2002, the Rwandan government announced
the withdrawal of its forces from eastern Congo,32 although reports of Rwan-
dan military activity in the region have persisted.3
B. RPF Authoritarian Rule, 1994-2004
Following the genocide, with the formation of the transitional government
led by the RPF, there was hope that Rwanda would transform into a country
that valued human rights and political pluralism.34 Since 1994, however, the
RPF has grown increasingly intolerant of criticism and has marginalized
Hutu and Tutsi opponents, causing over forty Rwandan politicians to flee
into exile.35 The government has manipulated the genocide to legitimize its
continued rule, using the accusations of "divisionism" and "genocidal ideol-
36
ogy" to weaken and destroy opposition. Under the cover of combating geno-
cide, promoting unity and reconciliation, and protecting Rwandan citizens
against discrimination, the Rwandan government has neutralized political
opposition, weakened the human rights community, silenced journalists, and
seriously undermined independent civil society.
Since 1994, the Rwandan government has suppressed peaceful political
opposition by driving perceived challengers into exile and engaging in po-
litical assassinations and arbitrary arrests of political rivals.37 It is widely
suspected that the government orchestrated the May 1998 assassination of
Seth Sendashonga, former RPF member and Minister of Interior, who had
fled to Kenya and formed the opposition party Resistance Forces for Democ-
racy. 38 In 2000, the government forced into exile former National Assembly
President Joseph Sebarenzi, a representative of the Liberal Party, a political
opposition party dominated by genocide survivors.3 9 In 2001, the govern-
ment arrested former President Pasteur Bizimungu and former Minister of
Social Affairs Charles Ntakirutanka for threatening state security because
they continued to operate the banned opposition party Democratic Party for
30. Id.
31. Press Release SC/7642, United Nations, Security Council Condemns Plunder of Democratic Re-
public of Congo's Resources, Requests New Six-Month Mandate for Investigative Panel (Jan. 24, 2003),
available at http:/www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7642.doc.htm.
32. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, supra note 27, at 3.
33. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DR. CONGO: WAR CRIMES IN BUKAvU (2004), available at http://hrw.
org/english/docs/2004/06/1l/congo8803.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2005); see also Michael Wines, U.N.
Reports a Possible Push into Congo by Rwandans, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 3, 2004, at A6.
34. Carina Tertsakian, Postscript: What Future for the Defence of Human Rights in Rwanda?, in ANDR9 SI-
BOMANA, HOPE FOR RWANDA: CONVERSATIONS WITH LAURE GUILBERT AND HERVE DEGUINE 168
(1999).
35. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, supra note 27, at i.
36. Id.
37. Tertsakian, supra note 34, at 169.
38. Id.
39. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, supra note 27, at 10.
2005 / Ingando Solidarity Camps
Renewal. 40 The government has also abused, harassed, and arrested inde-
pendent journalists from newspapers such as the now-defunct Le Partisan, and
Umuseso, ' Rwanda's only independent newspaper, which remains a constant
target of government attacks.42
During the 2003 presidential elections, the government dissolved the De-
mocratic Republican Movement ("MDR"), the only party, that could have
successfully challenged the RPF, branding them as harbingers of "genocidal
ideology., 43 Some MDR leaders fled the country while others were arrested
or "disappeared., 4  The European election observer mission questioned the
legitimacy of the 2003 presidential and legislative elections, noting that the
"RPF and its candidate Paul Kagame dominated the two electoral campaigns
which were marked by a climate of intimidation, questionings, and arrests.45
Although the Republic of Rwanda is comprised of executive, legislative,
and judicial branches that ideally should operate independently of one an-
other, one government official privately noted that "the parliamentary com-
mission is not independent of the Executive. ,16 Thus, it was not surprising
when, in 2004, the Rwandan Parliament accepted the findings of a parlia-
mentary commission report rife with unsubstantiated allegations, and re-
quested that the government dissolve several civil society organizations for
disseminating "genocidal ideology," including the respected League for the
Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (Ligue Rwandaise pour la Promotion
et la Defense des Droits de /'Homme, or "LIPRODHOR"), the most independent
47human rights organization in the country. In addition, the parliamentary
commission report accused religious institutions, secondary schools, a forum
of farmers' organizations, the national university, and national and interna-
tional organizations of disseminating "genocidal ideology." 4s
40. Reyntiens, supra note 6, at 193.
41. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, supra note 27, at 15.
42. Press Release, Amnesty International, Rwanda: Government Should Honour its Commitment to
Respect Press Freedom (Nov. 22, 2004), available at http://news.amnesty.org/index/ENGAFR4701520
04.
43. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RWANDA: PREPARING FOR ELECTIONS: TIGHTENING CONTROL IN THE
NAME OF UNITY 1 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0503bck.pdf (last
visited Feb. 4, 2005); see also Press Release, Amnesty International, Rwanda: Deeper into the Abyss-
Waging War on Civil Society (July 6, 2004), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAFR
470132004.
44. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 43, at 1.
45. MISSION D'OBSERVATION ELECTORALE DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE, RWANDA, ELECTION PRESI-
DENTIELLE 25 AOfT 2003, ELECTIONS LEGISLATIVES 29 ET 30 SEPTEMBRE, 2 OCTOBRE 2003, RAPPORT
FINAL 4 (2003), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/externalrelations/humanrights/euelectionass_
observ/rwanda/moe _ue final-2003.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005) (translated by author).
46. Interview with Rwandan Government Official (Oct. 2004).
47. Press Release, Amnesty International, supra note 43.
48. Id.
Harvard Human Rightsjournal / Vol. 18
C. Ingando: An Invented Tradition
The government claims that ingando is simply an updated version of a
Rwandan tradition. Although indigenous practices certainly provide fertile
ground from which reconciliation processes may bloom,49 ingando in its pre-
sent form appears to be a modern RPF political creation that serves to con-
solidate the RPF's power. Like many other governments, the RPF has an
interest in "inventing traditions" that legitimize current forms of social con-
trol or practice. Additionally, the government's appeal to culture may be an
attempt to deemphasize the political utility of ingando as a mechanism of
pro-RPF ideological indoctrination.
The government claims that the idea of using ingando to cultivate recon-
ciliation in Rwanda was born of meetings at Urugwiro State House in the
years following the genocide." According to Alex Rusagara, then program
officer of advocacy and current provincial coordinator for the National Unity
and Reconciliation Commission ("NURC"), ingando derives from the Kin-
yarwanda verb kuganika, which refers to a process in which the elders of a
community would leave the distractions of their daily lives and retreat to
places of isolation to solve problems of national concern such as war, famine,
drought, and the expansion of the nation's borders. 2 While the practice of
elders gathering together to address challenges facing the community is pre-
sent in Rwandan culture, there is little indication that this practice was ever
called "ingando."53 Ingando is more likely a pre-war RPF creation aimed at grass-
roots mobilization for RPF campaigns. From 1990 to 1993, the RPF in-
stalled participants in ingandos or "RPF schools" for three weeks, after which
participants would be expected to return to their villages and disseminate pro-
RPF ideology. 4 This RPF practice may have occurred in Uganda and the
RPF-controlled territories in Rwanda. In addition, the RPF, whose ideologi-
cal mentor is Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, may have modeled ingando on
solidarity camps in Uganda."
49. Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Abdul Aziz Said & Lakshitha S. Prelis, Conclusion: The Long Roadto Reconciisa-
tion, in RECONCILIATION, JUSTICE, AND COEXISTENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 343 (Mohammed Abu-
Nimer ed., 2001).
50. See generally THE INVENTION OF TRADITION (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., Cambridge
University Press 1992) (1983).
51. Interview with Alex Rusagara, Program Officer of Advocacy, National Unity and Reconciliation
Commission, in Kigali, Rwanda (Jan. 8, 2004).
52. Id.
53. Interview with Journalist, in Kigali, Rwanda (Jan. 7, 2004).
54. Id. Rusagara also conceded that the RPF practice of installing community members in camps for
the purpose of disseminating RPF ideology indeed took place before the civil war and genocide in 1994.
However, he claimed he has no knowledge of this practice being specifically referred to as "ingando."
Interview with Rusagara, supra note 51.
55. For a brief description of solidarity camps in Uganda, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HOSTILE TO
DEMOCRACY: THE MOVEMENT SYSTEM AND POLITICAL REPRESSION IN UGANDA 130-42 (1999), avail-
able at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/uganda/index.htm#TopOfPage (last visited Feb. 13, 2005).
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D. Aims and Activities of the Ingando Project
In 1996, ingando began in earnest. The program was originally adminis-
tered by the Ministry of Youth, Culture, and Sports. 6 The official goal of
ingando, in its infant stages, was the integration of Tutsi returnees who had
been separated from their homeland for years by events beyond their con-
trol. 7 The government began the ingando process for Tutsi returnees in order
to foster a sense of nationalism among the returnee populations from Congo,
Burundi, Uganda, Europe, and elsewhere. Rusagara notes that "we thought
that if we could remove these people from their daily lives and bring them
together to share from a common dish-to eat and sleep together-this
would build confidence in the diverse population of repatriated Rwandans,
confidence that we could in fact live together."'8 In addition, the govern-
ment was also determined to have the returnees embrace a pro-RPF ideology
that legitimized the political power structure.5
In 1999, the NURC took over the management of solidarity camps
601
throughout the country. Since the initial ingandos for Tutsi returnees, there
have been separate government-run solidarity camps for politicians, church
leaders, community leaders, ex-combatants, ex-soldiers, students, prostitutes,
gacaca judges, genocidaires, and women's associations. The NURC National
Plan is for every Rwandan of majority age to attend ingando at some point
during his or her life.61 Ingandos run from several days to several months, and
although the syllabus is adapted depending on the group participating,
there are similarities across the curricula of all ingandos, including lessons on
unity and reconciliation, history classes that highlight the defects of the
genocidal regime, and lessons on present government programs and policies
that stress the "democratic" elements of the current government.
III. INGANDO FOR EX-SOLDIERS AND EX-COMBATANTS
A. The Demobilization Procedure
It is presently compulsory for ex-RPF,62 ex-FAR who did not flee to Congo,
and ex-combatants who fought in Congo (ex-Armed Groups) to attend ingando
camps as a pre-demobilization, pre-discharge orientation program. Repa-
triated ex-FAR who originally fled to Congo have also attended ingando.6
56. Interview with Rusagara, supra note 51.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Interview with Journalist, supra note 53.
60. Id.
61. id.
62. Ex-RPF are also referred to as ex-RPA ("Rwandan Patriotic Army," the military wing of the RPF)
and ex-RDF ("Rwandan Defense Forces," newly introduced term referring to ex-RPF and ex-FAR who
joined the RPF).
63. Interview with John Zigira, Commissioner, Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commis-
sion, in Kigali, Rwanda (Jan. 8, 2004).
64. Id.
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Following the official end of the conflict in eastern Congo, the Rwandan
government is encouraging all Rwandan rebels/ex-Armed Groups (both
genocidaires and non-genocidaires) to return to Rwanda." The government is
offering a chance at reintegration and economic aid to all rebels, fearing that
if it does not assist these rebels in peaceful resettlement they will revitalize
the insurgency. Although many rebels remain in the forests of eastern
Congo, thousands of others, weary of war, have returned to their homeland,
citing horrible medical conditions in the bush, the currently stable situation
in Rwanda, the impact of appeals to return broadcast over the radio by gov-
ernment representatives and ex-rebels, and pressure to repatriate from Con-
golese villagers and government officials. "It was my will to return to
Rwanda," a Mutobo ingando participant noted after almost a decade of
fighting in Congo. "I must also stress that I want no more war in Rwanda
and that is one of the reasons I came back. ' 67 The men and women of the
armed rebellion, who comprise the current wave of returnees to Rwanda, are
put through a demobilization process carried out by the Rwandan Demobi-
lization and Reintegration Commission ("RDRC"). The heart of this process
is a two-month stay at ingando.
Ex-RPF, ex-FAR, and ex-Armed Groups have attended demobilization in-
gandos such as Mutobo Ingando in Ruhengeri province, Duha/Muhazi Ingando
in Kibungo province, and Maryohe Ingando in Gikongoro province. 6' A total
of 12,258 ex-FAR and almost 5000 ex-Armed Groups had attended demo-
bilization ingandos as of January 2004.69 Ingando for ex-Armed Groups is a
two-month program, and for ex-FAR and ex-RPF it is a two-week program.7
Topics at demobilization ingandos include civic education, unity and recon-
ciliation, government programs, psychological demilitarization, reintegra-
tion into civilian life, and HIV/AIDS. 7" Upon completion of ingando and the
demobilization process, ex-FAR, ex-Armed Groups, and ex-RPF are given
aid packages. 7' The World Bank finances forty-seven percent of the benefit
65. Id.; Interviews with Ex-Soldiers at Kinyinya Ingando, in Kigali, Rwanda (Jan. 11, 2004); Inter-
views with Ex-Combatants at Mutobo Ingando, in Ruhengeri, Rwanda (Jan. 10, 2004).
66. Interviews with Ex-Combatants at Mutobo Ingando, supra note 65.
67. Interview with Ex-Combatant at Mutobo Ingando, in Ruhengeri, Rwanda (Jan. 10, 2004).
68. Interview with Zigira, supra note 63; Interviews with Ex-Soldiers at Kinyinya Ingando, supra note
65; Interviews with Ex-Combatants at Mutobo Ingando, supra note 65; Interview with Fidel (last name
withheld), Assistant Coordinator, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, in Kigali, Rwanda
(Jan. 7, 2004).
69. Interview with Zigira, supra note 63.
70. Id.
71. Telephone Interview with Frank Musonera, Camp Manager, at Mutobo Ingando, in Ruhengeri,
Rwanda (Jan. 13, 2004); Interview with Zigira, supra note 63; Interview with Kigali Veterans' Associa-
tion Representative, in Kigali, Rwanda (Jan. 7, 2004).
72. Ex-RPF and ex-Armed Groups are given a Basic Needs Kit immediately upon exiting ingando. It
contains items worth less than U.S. $100, including transport home, a food stipend for three months,
and basic household supplies. Ex-FAR and ex-RPF are given a Recognition of Service Allowance. The
amount awarded is based on military rank. Six months after completion of ingando, ex-RPF and ex-
Armed Groups receive a one-time only Reintegration Grant worth U.S. $181. Medical Rehabilitation is
granted for all groups who were physically harmed during the civil war and war in eastern Congo. Ex-
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program for ex-soldiers and ex-combatants, while the Rwandan government
contributes fifty-three percent. 3 Follow-up services for ex-FAR, ex-Armed
Groups, and ex-RPF upon completion of ingando are rare. Unemployment
and difficulty reintegrating into civilian life remain chronic problems for ex-
soldiers and ex-combatants 4
In addition to demobilization, a former RPF soldier and representative of
a Rwandan veterans association maintained that "ingando has been used ...
to change the ideologies of ex-FAR ... who would be integrated into RDF
... so ingando has not just been used for demobilization purposes."7 5 Other
ex-soldiers who had attended ingandos at Duha/Muhazi and Maryohe
this observation. 6 "I am ex-FAR and returned from Congo in 1995,"confirmed  s a
stated an ex-soldier participating in his second solidarity camp at Kinyinya
Ingando in Kigali province. "I went to a previous ingando.... At Maryohe,
they gave us a choice of whether to join RDF or demobilize. I chose to de-
mobilize at the time because I had a wife. If not, I would have wanted to
join RDF. This was in 1998. There were only ex-FAR at Maryohe Ingando
and some later became RDE"7 7 Although the government denies they have
used ingando as a means of integrating ex-FAR into the current government
army, a prominent Rwandan journalist argued that the military encouraged
and in some cases may have forced ex-FAR who were participating in in-
gando and who were thought to possess superior technical and military skills
to integrate into the RDF.7 9 This journalist further emphasized that this
practice has kept the most talented soldiers of the former opposition in the
current government's military, thereby guaranteeing government control
over the soldiers' activities and neutralizing their potential opposition.
B. The Mutobo Ingando and Kinyinya Ingando Interviews
In January 2004, I conducted a series of interviews with ex-combatants at
Mutobo Ingando and ex-soldiers at Kinyinya Ingando. These interviews reveal
that political indoctrination is a dominant part of the ingando experience.
The RDRC-managed Mutobo Ingando housed 554 ex-Armed Groups in January
2004.81 The vast majority of these ex-combatants returned to Rwanda from
combatants and ex-soldiers who are HIV-positive or suffering from AIDS are not treated for HIV/AIDS.
In demobilization centers, RDRC manages a program for voluntary counseling and testing for AIDS. The
Vulnerability Support Window is for those individuals within all groups who find it especially difficult
to reintegrate into civilian life. This, however, does not include financial assistance. Interview with
Zigira, supra note 63.
73. Id
74. Interview with Kigali Veterans' Association Representative, supra note 71.
75. Id.
76. Interviews with Ex-Soldiers at Kinyinya Ingando, supra note 65.
77. Interview with Ex-Soldier at Kinyinya Ingando, in Kigali, Rwanda (Jan. 11, 2004).
78. Interview with Zigira, supra note 63.
79. Interview with Journalist, in Kigali, Rwanda (Jan. 6, 2004).
80. Id.
81. Interview with Zigira, supra note 63.
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Congo, with a small percentage of returnees having arrived from Zambia,
Malawi, Cameroon, Tanzania, and Uganda.82 Mutobo participants consisted
of both men and women, as well as fifty-six child soldiers who were sched-
uled to be transferred to another rehabilitation center on January 14, 2004.83
The ex-combatants remained at Mutobo for two and a half months. The
NURC operated Kinyinya Ingando, which was located in Kigali City and
consisted of 2000 demobilized soldiers (ex-RPF, ex-FAR, and ex-FAR who
had joined the RDF) from the Kigali Veterans Association ("KVA ,).84 The
camp commenced on January 3, 2004, and lasted for approximately two
weeks. 5 The NURC and the KVA organized Kinyinya Ingando in order to
address the reintegration and employment challenges that these men and
women have faced since their demobilization.
6
Many of the demobilized soldiers who attended Kinyinya Ingando had also
previously attended ingandos at Mutobo, Duha, or Maryohe for the purpose
of reintegration into the RDF or demobilization."' Kinyinya Ingando was
therefore a follow-up procedure in the reintegration process for demobilized
soldiers. Kinyinya Ingando was the first post-demobilization ingando set up
for ex-soldiers.88 The NURC is planning to set up similar ingandos for de-
mobilized soldiers in all thirteen provinces. s
A typical day for the men and women at both Mutobo and Kinyinya in-
volved playing sports, fetching water, singing songs, and listening to lec-
tures from government officials, including representatives from the Ministry
of Education, Ministry of Finance, NURC, RDRC, Ministry of Local Gov-
ernment, and Ministry of Defense.
1. Hopes and Harsh Realities
Many of the ex-combatants at Mutobo Ingando expressed optimism re-
garding their futures and listed home support, education, and the freedom
to "live as other Rwandans" among their future hopes. 90 Ingando leaders
planted and nurtured this optimism. "I know my community will welcome
me because I have no problem," an ex-combatant who returned from Congo
in 2004 confidently stated. "It has been a long time-ten years-so they
will welcome me. In the country, maybe some Rwandans will fear me as an
outsider. But so far the people I have met with [at ingando] are saying that
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Interview with Fidel, supra note 68.
85. Id.
86. Id.; Interview with Kigali Veterans' Association Representative, supra note 71.
87. Interview with Fidel, supra note 68; Interview with Kigali Veterans' Association Representative,
supra note 71; Interviews with Ex-Soldiers at Kinyinya Ingando, supra note 65.
88. Interview with Fidel, supra note 68.
89. Id.
90. Interviews with Ex-Combatants at Mutobo Ingando, supra note 65.
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there are no problems." 9 The optimism that ingando may have instilled in
some ex-combatants, however commendable, is in many ways misleading.
Mutobo's ex-combatants often seemed ignorant of the difficulties they will
face when they leave ingando and its safe environs. Interviews of ex-soldiers
and ex-combatants at Kinyinya Ingando, who in some cases had been demo-
bilized for years, revealed that the harsh realities of unemployment and
difficulty adjusting to civilian life continue to haunt demobilized soldiers. A
representative of the KVA, an organization that represents 20,000 ex-
soldiers and ex-combatants, related the challenges that many members of
KVA experience:
We started the association because many veterans were having a
difficult time adjusting to civilian life, and we knew that these
problems could not be solved on an individual level. There is
strength in numbers .... [Hiow do we get jobs, take care of our
families? Most of the veterans [here at Kinyinya Ingando] have been
through other ingandos like Mutobo and Duha. Most of the veter-
ans are peasants, people who are uneducated, unversed in the trap-
pings of modern life, people of the bush. Many have had
difficulties adjusting to modern life. We want to truly live in soci-
ety because many of us have never lived in society. So, three
months ago we requested that NURC set up this camp to help our
veterans who are having a difficult time.9'
"I demobilized three years ago," noted a female ex-soldier and KVA member
at Kinyinya. "I have not had work since I was demobilized. "" Indeed, I did
not speak to a single ex-soldier at Kinyinya Ingando who was currently em-
ployed. A NURC representative at Kinyinya noted that "although we at-
tempt to teach them [the soldiers] how to live as civilians, when they leave
Mutobo and other ingandos, many still have the spirit of soldiers. ' 94 For in-
gando to serve as a successful catalyst into civilian life, ingando leaders must
avoid simply nurturing blind optimism and, instead, must honestly address
the difficulties that demobilized soldiers will and do encounter and must
attempt to provide ex-soldiers and ex-combatants with the tools they will
need to face these problems.
2. Pledging Allegiance: A Trade-Offfor Peaceful Reintegralion
At both Mutobo and Kinyinya, as at most ingandos, lecturers were com-
prised solely or overwhelmingly of government representatives, while voices
critical of government policies or their implementation were generally ab-
sent. This strengthens this Note's contention that ideology remains a central
91. Interview with Ex-Combatant at Mutobo Ingando, in Ruhengeri, Rwanda (Jan. 10, 2004).
92. Interview with Kigali Veterans' Association Representative, supra note 71.
93. Interview with Ex-Soldier at Kinyinya Ingando, in Kigali, Rwanda (Jan. 11, 2004).
94. Interview with Fidel, supra note 68.
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tenet of the ingando project. The government counters that they invite a di-
verse assortment of speakers to ingandos, including civil society organiza-
tions.95 Rusagara indicated that the NURC generally approaches organiza-
tions and individuals outside of the government to speak at ingando and that
the NURC is open to requests by NGOs and individuals who want to take
advantage of the unique opportunity to make presentations to targeted audi-
ences converged at ingando.96 Rusagara claimed that the only requests the
NURC would deny would be those from individuals or organizations that
support "genocidal ideologies.
9 7
Overt criticism of the ingando process was yirtually non-existent during
my interviews of ex-soldiers and ex-combatants at Mutobo and Kinyinya.
Almost all complained of the monotonous cuisine of beans and maize served
at the camps, 8 and one interviewee at Kinyinya, where the physical infra-
structure consists of tents held up by sticks of wood, suggested that the gov-
ernment could improve their sleeping conditions,99 but even these benign
criticisms rarely dominated the interviews. The vast majority of the inter-
viewees repeatedly hailed the current government and stressed the importance
of understanding the government's achievements-responses that seemed
like recitations of what they had heard during ingando lessons. A Mutobo
Ingando participant proclaimed that "the lesson of government programs is
most important. They show us how this government is good. There is de-
mocracy here, freedom of speech, no segregation in education. They tell us
that our mentality was wrong, that our leaders were wrong and that's why
we were wrong. ' 1°° Another Mutobo Ingando participant concurred, stating
that "they teach us that this is a government of democracy. The rebel group
I was from was a strong group that wanted to come and take over the gov-
ernment. They try and change our bad mentalities toward the government. "0'
"Ingando helps us speak the same language," argued an ex-soldier at Kiny-
inya Ingando.'° 2 For another Mutobo interviewee, ingando served as a neces-
sary transition mechanism from ten years of fighting in Congo: "They're
trying to upgrade us to the level of the local people. If you come from the
bush and go directly to the people you don't know their mentality. Ingando
teaches you this.'
0 3
The ingando participants and ex-soldiers at Kinyinya seemed to have
genuinely internalized an overwhelmingly positive view of the RPF-led gov-
ernment, but the same cannot be said for the ex-combatants at Mutobo, who
95. Interview with Rusagara, supra note 51.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Interviews with Ex-Combatants at Mutobo Ingando, supra note 65; Interviews with Ex-Soldiers at
Kinyinya Ingando, supra note 65.
99. Interview with Ex-Soldier at Kinyinya Ingando, in Kigali, Rwanda (Jan. 11, 2004).
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also presented themselves as current government loyalists. The proclaimed
"allegiance" that returning rebels proclaim to the present government ap-
pears to be their end in a bargain for reintegration. The government has in-
vited the rebels to return from eastern Congo, and in exchange for peaceful
reintegration the ex-combatants give lip service to the ideas of "unity and
reconciliation" and the "democratic achievements" of the present govern-
ment. Although several ex-Armed Groups trumpeted the need to change
"bad mentalities" and reorient mindsets and outlooks toward the present
government, they rarely claimed these "bad mentalities" as their own. One
ex-combatant spoke of the need for returning rebels to change their "bad
mentalities" toward the RPF, and in the same contradictory breath, hailed
the "victory" of his rebel group over the present government and their im-
munity from punishment.' Ex-combatants may well fear for their safety if
they do not praise the current government. The rebels, along with many of
their family members, are housed and fed by the government for months at
ingando camps, and are therefore in highly vulnerable positions, susceptible
to attempts at political indoctrination. In addition, ex-combatants receive
government and World Bank-financed aid packages after successful comple-
tion of the ingando and demobilization process, a factor that may further en-
courage them to proclaim "allegiance" to the government.
C. "After the War, I Did Not Even Receive a Saucepan": Government Benefits for
Ex-Combatants Versus Government Benefits for Genocide Survivors
The process of providing government aid to ex-combatants on completion
of ingando is a source of tension and debate within Rwandan society. The fact
that ex-combatants receive aid packages, while few genocide survivors re-
ceive government assistance, is bound to have great implications for the process
of reconciliation in Rwanda. However, the Rwandan demobilization pro-
gram is unfair in the way that any demobilization program is unfair. In or-
der to seduce combatants into putting down their arms permanently, gov-
ernments must provide them with financial assistance and viable alternatives
to violence. The demobilization and socioeconomic reintegration of ex-combat-
ants are essential aspects of peace-building. If compensation for all survivors
became a reality, this would alleviate the feeling on the part of some survi-
vors that they have become invisible in post-genocide Rwanda. Survivor
organizations have met with government officials for the past ten years to
discuss the possibility of compensation, to no avail.' 5
Survivors have no socioeconomic or political clout in Rwanda, and it is
understandably impossible for survivors to understand that pragmatically,
the government must also cater to Hutu ex-combatants. "When you say mili-
tia, the government stands up," a representative of genocide survivors la-
104. Interview with Ex-Combatant at Mutobo Ingando, in Ruhengeri, Rwanda (Jan. 10, 2004).
105. Interview with Genocide Survivor Representative, in Kigali, Rwanda (Jan. 13, 2004).
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mented. "When you say survivors, orphans, those who were infected with
AIDS by these militia, no one stands up."'1 6 Another survivor noted that
"the government is concentrating on interahamwe. After the war I did not
even receive a saucepan. I am surprised to see what the interahamwe are get-
ting now that they have returned."1 0 7 Yet, it is important to note that it
would be incorrect to characterize all ex-combatants emerging from the for-
ests of Congo as genocidaires. Some were simply innocents, caught in the fog
of war. As a rebel noted,
Some people outside [in Congo] were wrong. There were some
leaders who were outside who were wrong. But not all [the rebels]
were wrong. There are those who left in 1994 that did wrong, but
not all who left did wrong. Wrongdoers should be punished by the
government. The problem is that wrongdoers and innocents can be
called together and then all are called wrongdoers.
0 8
It must also be noted that ex-Armed Groups who receive government aid
packages continue to suffer from the same problems of poverty and unem-
ployment that plague the majority of Rwandans, despite the government aid
they receive following successful completion of ingando and demobilization
procedure.
Although there is a government system in place to aid genocide survivors
in need, it remains chronically under-funded and reaches only a small per-
centage of survivors. The Fund for Assistance to Genocide Survivors ("FARG")
is a quasi-governmental organization that caters to the health, education,
and housing needs of impoverished survivors.0 9 The annual budget of FARG
is five percent of the government's budget, roughly U.S. $10,000,000. 0
Although FARG has made strides in providing some survivors with educa-
tion and basic housing and living needs, it simply does not have sufficient
funds to cater to the needs of the tens of thousands of survivors, who like
most of their Rwandan brethren, live in poverty. However, it is not solely a
lack of funding that provides challenges to an efficient, fair, and responsible
distribution of the fund. Interviews with genocide survivors in Kigali re-
vealed that survivors who received benefits had to seek out these benefits
actively. One survivor received support from FARG for school fees, mat-
tresses, bed sheets, and health services, but conceded that "I had to go out
and look for these benefits. No one came to see what I needed. I sought out
help because I had a child to provide for.... Those who did not hustle for
FARG benefits seemed to go without the benefits the fund provides, despite
106. Id.
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need. Elderly survivors are particularly susceptible to falling through the
cracks. There have also been reports that FARG suffers from corruption."'
The challenges that FARG faces in terms of lack of funding, difficulties
identifying those in need, and corruption further compounds the feeling of
many survivors that they have been forgotten.
IV. INGANDO FOR STUDENTS
A. Creating a Generation of RPF Loyalists
Ingando for Rwandan students is the most prevalent form of ingando. Rwan-
dan students who complete secondary school attend ingando before they
commence their university studies. Students spend an average of two months in
ingando camps studying the "Achievements of the Government," "The Dig-
nity of the Banyarwanda," history, the "ethnicity question," unity and recon-
ciliation, Western and Eastern philosophy, and economic and technological
concerns facing the country. 113 There are three phases of the ingando process
for students. Students spend the first two weeks engaging in activities that
encourage independent thought and critical analysis. 1 4 During the second
phase, the students are encouraged to identify political, economic, and social
struggles facing the nation."5 In the final phase, the students break up into
smaller groups and debate and discuss possible solutions to these national
challenges.''
6
Rwandan university students are the future leaders of Rwandan society,
and the vast majority have attended government-run ingando camps. Hence,
the ingando process provides the government with the opportunity to mold
the opinions of young students and orient them toward the RPF-led gov-
ernment, helping to create a generation of RPF loyalists. An interview with
a student who attended Mutobo Ingando (which, in addition to ex-combatants,
also houses student attendees at different times of the year) revealed that
ingando is centered on the praise of the present RPF-led government:
Our teachers characterized the past governments as solely wanting
to hold onto power, and this was contrasted with the current gov-
ernment. The current government was characterized as caring pri-
marily about reconciliation and not necessarily about holding onto
power. They stressed that this government had held parliamentary,
presidential, and local elections, and that refugees were returning.
We were given the right to criticize the government, but I found
nothing to criticize, and students at the ingando I attended never
112. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, "MARKED FOR DEATH": RAPE SURVIVORS LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS
IN RWANDA (2004), available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engafr470072004 (last visited Feb.
19, 2004).
113. Interview with Former Ingando Student, in Kigali, Rwanda (Jan. 5, 2004).
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criticized the tactics of the government. I found that most students
were impressed by the achievements of the current government."'
When asked to provide suggestions for improvements to the ingando system,
students often seemed perplexed by the question and were often unable or
unwilling to offer any constructive criticism. Only one student provided a
proposal for improvement, recommending that the government provide in-
gando students with better clothing and bedding and that it raise the sanita-
tion and health standards at the camps. 18
B. Erasing "Myths of Ethnic Difference"
The Rwandan government is a minority regime with roots in Marxism/
Leninism that is trying to survive by dissolving the idea of ethnicity."9
Thus, it is unsurprising that the ingando syllabus for pre-university students,
likely to become the country's future leaders, emphasizes erasing "myths of
ethnic difference" in Rwanda without confronting the role that political
constructions and utilizations of ethnicity continue to play in post-genocide
Rwanda. Reeducation regarding the ethnicity question in Rwanda is at the
heart of the ingando program for students. 20 Students learn about Rwanda as
a nation before colonialism, the damaging effects of colonialism, and the
creation of "myths of difference"-the "myth of the oppressors," "myth of the
oppressed," and "myth of ethnicity.' 2' "At ingando, they taught us ... the
idea of ethnicity within Rwanda was a colonial concoction," noted a former
ingando student.
The colonialists brought these ideas so that they could strengthen
their politics .... I knew that we spoke the same language and
had the same culture so I didn't understand when people spoke of
different ethnic groups in Rwanda. What difference does it make if
you have a thin nose or a flat nose? ... [Alfter ingando I identify
only as Rwandan.'22
There are two sharply divided camps within Rwandan society concerning
the thorny issue of ethnicity. Some believe that there is no ethnic distinction
between Tutsi and Hutu, and any attempt to ethnically differentiate between.
the two groups is an appeal to the colonial strategy of divide-and-rule.
2
1
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Others contend that there is an ethnic distinction,'24 and by denying it in-
gando forces Rwandans to forget their origins. 2' For the second camp, in-
gando is dangerous because instead of teaching tolerance for "difference," it
leads to an obliteration of "difference" that lies about history and the "truth"
of origins for the sake of peace and reconciliation. 2 6 One Rwandan journalist
believes that this aspect of ingando is tantamount to "brainwashing.', 127 "[Ilt
is often important for people to put nation over ethnic identity," noted an-
other Rwandan journalist who has written extensively on ingando,
But it is wrong to tell people not to identify as what they are. To
say that a Hutu should not identify as a Hutu, that her Rwan-
daness obliterates her Hutu identity is wrong. In the past people
have used ethnic identities as political tools and to do so is wrong
but that does not mean we should destroy and erase these identi-
ties altogether for the sake of the nation."'
Critics contend that ingando negatively results in an "obliteration of dif-
ference" by attempting to destroy the idea of Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa as ethnic
distinctions in Rwanda.'29 Speaking on behalf of the NURC, Rusagara as-
serted:
The government is determined to strengthen national mechanisms
and create a society in which one's access to health services, the mar-
ket, education, and all other social services is dependent on the fact
that they are a Rwandan national, regardless of whether they iden-
tify as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa. We [the NURC] have no problem with
people choosing to identify as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa so long as this
identification, this ethnic conviction, does not deprive anyone else
of their rights. Our aim is not to destroy these identities because they
have been used as political ammunition. Even within the NURC,
there is an informal debate regarding the issue of ethnicity. We are
not telling ingando participants not to identify as Hutu, Tutsi, or
Twa, but we are aiming to create a society in which these identities
have no real meaning because they impart no privileges. 3 °
Rusagara's sophisticated argument that ethnic identification, although per-
missible, should not become the basis for invidious differences and distinc-
tions, runs counter to most of the government discourse on ethnicity. The
government claims that there is no such thing as ethnicity in Rwanda and
124. ELTRINGHAM, supra note 123, at 1-33.
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has all but outlawed ethnic identification of any kind.'31 Although the gov-
ernment allegedly aims to erase ethnicity, it still appeals to ethnicity when
doing so suits its political goals." 2
The government's determination to erase ethnicity for the purpose of po-
litical survival is an understandable strategy, but it will not be successful.
What the government fails to acknowledge, and what the ingando project
fails to explore, is that Rwanda remains a society in which many (if not most)
Rwandans still cling to the idea of ethnicity, despite the havoc and destruc-
tion that this concept has wreaked. Ethnicity is a powerful idea; it cannot sim-
ply be talked out of existence. The Rwandan government has gone to the
extreme of all but outlawing references to ethnicity within the national dis-
course 33 and has romanticized pre-colonial Rwandan history.134 The goyern-
ment will do a disservice to its people by ignoring the ethnic stereotypes
that continue to flourish behind closed doors. After all, "limiting talk about
ethnicity does not eradicate its potency. It might just send it under-
ground.
'
,
'3
"
C. The Need for Historical and Historiographical Education
Both the ingando program and general public discourse in Rwanda must
involve enlightened discussions about history and historiography that un-
cover the political and social nature of ethnicity. The desire for a nuanced
understanding of Rwandan history was evident in interviews with students
who had attended ingando. "When I was younger," noted a former ingando
student,
I remember hearing stories about how the Tutsis had come from
Abyssinia. But I always wondered, if this was true, why is there no
trace of Amharic words in Kinyarwanda? At ingando, the history
lessons took hours because there were many who had similar ques-
tions ... I realized that many students, like me, had grown up
136questioning.
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Ingando is apparently the only forum in which history is currently taught
in Rwanda. "In secondary school we didn't learn about history," said another
former ingando student who no longer subscribes to the idea of ethnicity in
Rwanda." 7 The government is not teaching history in Rwandan schools be-
cause the RPF does not know how it wants to present history. This is a mis-
take. There are those who seek to rewrite Rwandan history by either deny-
ing the genocide of the Tutsi minority or by arguing that RPF massacres of
Hutu amounted to a double genocide. 38 These ideas present dangerous and
vicious untruths, and by failing to teach history, the government leaves a
vacuum that such revisionism may occupy. Programs of education that con-
front the past can help shape collective memory."' Thus, the government
must teach historiography and explore the competing versions of history,
helping Rwandans to think creatively about history.
The government probably will not succeed in forcing the RPF's version of
history onto people who grew up under the Habyarimana regime. A one-
sided, pro-RPF interpretation of history will inspire resentment and will be
too easy for people to dismiss as propaganda. They may mouth government
rhetoric, but they will not necessarily reorient themselves. A curriculum
that explores history should be integrated into the school curriculum, and
should be free of pro-RPF spin, so that honest and open reeducation be-
comes an ongoing aspect of people's lives.
V. INGANDO FOR RELEASED GENOCIDAIRES:
THE POLITICS OF VICTIMIZATION
Reconciliation within Rwanda partly depends on accountability and rec-
ognition of the many levels of victimization that have occurred within Rwan-
dan society. The need for accountability was underscored following the first
mass release of prisoners at the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003. In
2003, the Rwandan government carried out a mass release of 23,000 prison-
ers accused of genocide. 4 ° The released genocidaires included those who had
participated in the government confession program, those who were children
during the time of the genocide (ages fourteen and below), the elderly, the
terminally ill, and accused genocidaires who had no information in their case
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files to support the charge of genocide."' A task force comprised of a cross
section of actors from the Ministry of Justice, Human Rights Commission,
Ministry of Finance, police, local governments, and Office of the President
decided that it was essential that as many of the released genocidaires as pos-
sible complete ingando.'42 The released prisoners, excluding the terminally ill
and elderly, went straight from pre-trial detention to a three month stint at
ingando. The government also hoped that ingando would provide an oppor-
tunity to gain valuable information from the genocidaires regarding how they
became involved in the genocide, what they expected to gain from partici-
pating in the genocide, and what they feared would happen to them if they
did not participate in the genocide.4 4 The NURC installed ingandos in all
thirteen provinces, and thousands of genocidaires attended. Many now await
gacaca, an alternative form of "community justice" with the stated purpose
of delivering justice for crimes committed during the genocide, and are liv-
144ing back in their communities.
The politics of "victimization"--defining who is a "victim" in Rwanda
and therefore who should be treated as such-is a central theme of the de-
bate regarding reconciliation within Rwandan society. Is it accurate to char-
acterize everyone who lived under the genocidal regime, including the geno-
cidaires themselves, as victims? According to Johnston Busingye, Secretary
General of the Ministry of Justice, if one thinks of genocidaires as not simply
criminals but victims in their own right, then the concept of rehabilitation
through ingando is not only conceivable but also invaluable:
We found that the released prisoners were very confused and ques-
tioned how and why they became involved in the genocide. They
realized that those who were the architects of the genocide had fled
to the U.S., Kenya, and elsewhere, while they were left to rot in
prison, while their children remained out of school, and their wives
lived for years without husbands .... We must believe in rehabili-
tation for these people because they, too, were victims. We must
interrogate history and look closely at what happened from 1959
to 1994. The major culprits of the genocide were those who man-
aged the politics of the state, not the people who pushed the wheel-
barrows in town. These people were born into a system that used
genocide as a political tool. Genocide is not possible without the
support of the state, and therefore this generation, both those who
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survived the genocide and those who participated in it, were vic-
tims of a system that went viciously off course. 4'
There is no doubt that the genocide, far from an explosion of "ancient tribal
hatred," was politically planned and premeditated; 46 in that sense, this gen-
eration was indeed manipulated by the genocidal aspirations of a modern
political elite. But is the only path towards reconciliation the "just affirma-
tion of the humanity of the victim and the perpetrator" ? 14 , Some Rwandans
argue that the only way to move forward is to view all Rwandans as victims
who need to be made whole, as long as they are willing to work in partner-
ship with their fellow Rwandans in this quest. But the danger of engaging
in the politics of victimization, in which everyone, including the perpetra-
tors of mass atrocity, are deemed victims, is that it leads to an undermining
of personal accountability. Reconciliation without accountability is neither
possible nor desirable.
True reconciliation in Rwanda is also impossible if the government con-
tinues to refuse to acknowledge the crimes committed against innocent Hutu
following the genocide. The government has done everything in its power to
prevent the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda from prosecuting
RPF crimes, has tried and convicted only one RPF senior officer for massa-
cres committed in 1994, and has refused to allow accountability for RPF crimes
in the gacaca courts.148 Although the government assigns victim status to "mod-
erate Hutu," those killed by the FAR, interahamwe, and Presidential Guard
during the genocide, its refusal to assign victim status to Hutu killed by the
RPF undermines the process of reconciliation in Rwanda. In addition, the
assignment of collective guilt for the genocide to all Hutu, as opposed to the
assignment of individual responsibility, undermines the recognition and
prosecution of genocide. 4 In contrast, assigning individual guilt and ac-
knowledging that victimization took place on many levels during and fol-
lowing the genocide would affirm the humanity of all Rwandans.
VI. CONCLUSION
Government officials have exaggerated the success of ingando as a recon-
ciliation mechanism. The government will do a disservice to its population
and the process of reconciliation by overstating the claim of reconciliation
through ingando without acknowledging the difficult road ahead. According
to the NURC, there are many indications of the success of ingando. Rusagara
contends that at first "it was war" to convince Rwandans to attend ingando.15 °
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.These initial difficulties have dissipated, he argues, and non-governmental
and civil society organizations approach the NURC with relative frequency
to set up government-run ingandos for their constituents or to seek govern-
ment funding for privately run ingandos.5 1 The NURC believes this shift is
an indication of the mainstream status ingando currently enjoys in Rwandan
society. In addition, in both private and public universities, former students
of ingando have set up chapters of the Students Club for Unity and Recon-
ciliation in an attempt to disseminate the central tenets of ingando outside
the formal ingando setting."' Urumuri ("Light") is a group comprised of ex-
FAR who have attended ingando and encourage other ex-FAR to return and
reconcile with society.' According to Rusagara, ingando's future as a catalyst
for reconciliation is limitless:
There is a harmonious cohesion within the social fabric of Rwan-
dan society. Look at the peaceful streets of Kigali and the peaceful
national elections. Orphanages are closing down in large numbers
because people are opening up their homes to orphans regardless of
whether these children are Hutu or Tutsi. Ex-FAR and RPA have
merged into the RDF-people who once fought each other in the
past are now working well together. Genocidaires who went through
ingando are now living peacefully next to survivors. There are no
powerful antagonisms. Ingando is bearing fruit.
5 4
This brand of government spin purposefully conceals the reality that ani-
mosities still exist and even flourish in Rwandan society. Although there are
some Rwandans who may agree that the seeds of reconciliation have indeed
been planted and are bearing fruit, there are still many others who speak of
bitterness, a simmering, a country at times waiting to explode.
Ingando, in principle, is a creative attempt to foster reconciliation and
grapple with the past within post-genocide Rwanda, but the time period
spent within ingando is simply too short for it to have a deep and lasting impact.
The success of ingando depends on its participants living out the concepts of
unity and reconciliation imparted at ingando in their daily lives, long after
they have left the solidarity camp. The focus on political indoctrination also
severely undermines ingando as a reconciliation mechanism. Moreover, the
government's continued attacks on civil society and perceived political op-
position threaten to undermine reconciliation programs like ingando. If in-
gando is absorbed into the school setting and if the leaders of ingando create a
curriculum that includes honest critiques of the current administration and
open discussions about history, ingando can be a worthy and creative take on
the difficult business of societal healing.
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